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I . INTRODUCTION
The main contribution of this thesis is the design and
analysis of an access control mechanism for the Multi-
Backend Database System (MDBS). The design outlines of the
access control mechanism have been suggested in [Ref.2]. In
this thesis, the detailed design and analysis are given. To
this end, we first present the general concepts of computer





"Computer security deals with the managerial procedures
and technological safeguards applied to computer hardware,
software, and data to assure against accidental or
deliberate unauthorized access to and dissemination of
computer system data" [Ref.1]. The importance of computer
security can best be appreciated if the computer is used to
store and process the information about military secrecy or
proprietary industrial items.
Computer security can be considered in four basic
layers: physical security, hardware security, software
security and database security. Physical security deals
with the protection of computer against physical accesses.
Physical access can be controlled with managerial,
identification and authentication procedures. Hardware,
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software and database security are necessary only after
physical access to the computer is accomplished. Hardware
security deals with the protection of the user's data and
program from other users by way of hardware protection
mechanisms such as memory protection. Software security
deals with the protection of the user's data and program by
way of software protection mechanisms. The basic mechanisms
for software security are surveillance, threat monitoring
and access control. Surveillance is to keep track of the
user and the associated resources which are requested by the
user. Access control deals with the user access
authorization for resources during the program execution'.
These resources can be programs, files, etc. Logically , the
operating system handles the access control with an access
control matrix indexed by user-ids and resource-ids where
each entry of the matrix consists of authorizations for the
user to access the corresponding resource.
Database security is concerned with the protection of
databases stored in the computer. If data of a database
must be kept confidential, then the database must be
protected against unauthorized accesses. When a large
amount of confidential data must be processed and protected,
the issues of database security become very important.
Since our main subject is to provide an access control
mechanism for a database system, we will elaborate the
issues of database security in the following section. Other
1 1
security issues will not be the subject for discussion in
this thesis.
B. DATABASE SECURITY
The principal problem for database security can be
defined as determining who can access which data and what
are the operations allowed on the data. This may be thought
of as the same as the basic resource-access control problem
which has been presented above. In essence, the problem is
handled with the similar techniques, but, here, the argument
is the comprehension of the semantics of the data rather
than the basic resource-ids. For example, the basic question
for access control is to decide 'who' can perform 'what'
operations on 'which' data in the database. First two
questions can be argued for both the resource-access control
and the database access control, but to specify 'which'
portion of the the database is to be authorized for the
users may be more involved with the data model and semantics
of the data.
Database management systems treat data differently than
traditional data processing systems. Traditional data
processing systems store data as a collection of values but
database management systems store data as a collection of
attribute-value pairs and relationships among the pairs. The
attributes allow us to view the types or characteristics of
12
corresponding values. The relationships allow us to relate
one type of values to another type of values.
In the database system under discussion (MDBS), we will
consider database security for databases which are organized
as attribute-value pairs. This gives us uniform
representation of information and we can keep track of some
semantic relationships among data.
C. ACCESS DECISION PROBLEMS OF DATABASE SECURITY
Access decision may be based on the following factors.
Access decision on value - sensitive information depends on
the current value of data and the user's authorized value
limits. Access decision on state - sensitive information
depends on the dynamic state of the database management
system. For example, the user can open a file only if it is
not in an unlocked state. There is pattern - sensitive
information, such that, the user may be allowed to sort a
file but he may not be allowed to read the content of the
file. History - sensitive information must be protected
against a series of operations which may allow some
inferences about unauthorized information. For example, if
ranks and salaries of persons in the database are
coincident, then the user can read the rank of a person and
infer the salary. Event - sensitive information must be
protected from the user during the unauthorized period. For
13
example, tellers can only access the system during the
working hours.
The access control mechanism for a database management
system should protect all types of information presented
above. However, since protections of some of these types are
difficult to implement, most systems do not implement for
all the types.
D. ACCESS CONTROL PRECISION
After an access decision, the database management system
must perform physical access to the database in order to
fetch authorized and requested data. The database
management system should access only authorized and
requested data. This is necessary for performance and
security reasons. A system which fetches only authorized
and requested data is called a system with absolute
precision . Absolute precision must be the ultimate goal of
database management system designers.
Database management systems without absolute precision
cause the pass - through problem
,
since they fetch some
unnecessary data in order to access the authorized and
requested data. If the data which have been passed through
have more stringent security feature then there may be a
security breach. The system should have either absolute
precision or solve the bad aspect of the pass-through
problem.
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In the next two subsections, some basic approaches for
the pass-through problem will be described. Detailed
information can be found in [Ref.1].
1 . Compartmentalization
The data with identical protection requirements are
grouped and stored together. These groups with uniform
security requirements are called security atoms
. Security
atoms become the unit for access. If we do not need all
records in a security atom then we will have access
imprecision. However, we will not have the pass-through
problem, since none of the unnecessary records in the
security atom have the higher level protection requirements
than the authorized ones.
2 . Multilevel Security
It may be desirable to classify the data in the
database by hierarchical layers. The user may have access
authorization up to a certain security level. This notion
can be combined with the security atom concept. Each
security atom may belong to a classification level. So, the
combination of security atoms with the same security
classification can be used to create these layers.
E. ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN METHODOLOGY FOR DATABASE
SYSTEMS
We have seen that database security deals with the
semantics of data. Before designing the access control
15
system, the designer must study and analyze the system's
data model. Since, most of the time, the data abstractions
are very large and complex, this analysis must be very
orderly and in only necessary detail. The designer has to
look for a standpoint to start. It can be an uniform data
unit for security atom concept, etc.
There is only one interface between the user and the
database system, the request. The access control system must
recognize requests and it must have a mechanism to start the
access decision with information available in request.
In the next chapter, we will give an overview of MDBS in
terms of data abstraction, data manipulation language and
basic request execution process in order to understand the
system and utilize the system facilities in the access
control mechanism. In the third chapter, we will describe
the basic design issues of MDBS access control system and
the access control information requirements . In the following
chapters, we will elaborate the the basic steps of the
access control system.
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II . kU OVERVIEW OF THE MULTI - BACKEND DATABASE SYSTEM (MDBS)
In this chapter, we will introduce the general structure
of the multi-backend database system (MDBS). MDBS has been
designed in [Ref.2] and [Ref.3], and the implementation of
the system has been presented in CRef.4], [Ref.5] and
[Ref.6]. The information in this chapter has been extracted
from [Ref.4] and [Ref.5].
A. A TOP-LEVEL VIEW OF MDBS
One minicomputer functions as the controller, with
multiple minicomputers and their disks configured in a
parallel manner to serve as backends [Ref.2, Ref.4]. The
database is distributed on secondary storage across all of
the backends. User access is accomplished through a host
computer communicating with the controller. The MDBS
structure can be classified as a centralized system,
although the hardware is distributed.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the controller and the backends
are connected by a broadcast bus. When a transaction is
received from the host computer, the controller broadcasts
the transaction to all the backends at the same time. Each
backend has a number of dedicated disk drives. Since the
data is distributed across the backends, a transaction can
be executed by all backends in parallel. Each backend
17
maintains a queue of transactions. When one transaction has
been executed, the backend can begin execution on another
transaction from its queue.
B. A TOP-LEVEL VIEW OF THE MDBS DATA MoDEL
The data model chosen for the system is the attribute-
based data model [Ref.2]. In MDBS the database consists of
files of records. Each record is a collection of keywords,
optionally followed by a record body. A keyword is made of
an attribute-value pair such as <SALARY
,
$ 1 2 ,000> where
$12,000 is the value of the attribute SALARY. A record body
is a string of characters not used by MDBS for search
purposes. An example of a record without a record body is
shown below.
( <FILE,Employee>, <EMPLOYEE_NAME ,Smith> , <CITY , Columbus>
,
<SALARY,$12,000>, <SERVICE,10> )
The first attribute-value pair in all records of a file
are the same. In particular, the attribute is FILE and the
value is the file name . For example, the above record is
from the Employee file.






form (attribute, relational operator, value). A relational
operator can be one of the set { =, ! = , >, >= , <, =< }. A







Figu3pe 2.1 The MDBS Hardware Organization
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of K is identical to the attribute in P and the relation
specified by the relational operator of P holds between the
value of K and the value in P. For example, the keyword
<SALARY, 15000> satisfies the predicate (SALARY > 10000).
2 . Three Types of Descriptors
A descriptor can be one of three types: Type-A,
Type-B and Type-C. A Type-A descriptor is a conjunction of
a less-than-or-equal-to predicate and a greater-than-or-
equal-to predicate, such that the same attribute appears in
both predicates. An example of a type-A descriptor is as
follows:
((SALARY >= 2,000) and (SALARY =< 10,000)).
More simply, this is written as (2,000 =< SALARY =< 10,000).
A Type-B descriptor is an equality predicate. An
example of a type-B descriptor would be (POSITION =
Manager )
.
A Type-C descriptor consists of only an attribute
name, known as the type -C attribute . Let us assume that
there are n different keywords K1, K2 , ..., Kn, in the
records of a database with a type-C attribute. Then, this
type-C descriptor is really equivalent to n type-B
descriptors B1 , B2 , ..., Bn , where Bi is the equality
predicate satisfied by Ki. In fact, this type-C descriptor
will cause n different type-B descriptors to be formed. From
now on, we shall refer to the type-B descriptors formed from
20
a type-C descriptor as type -C sub -descriptors . For
instance, consider that DEPT is specified as a type-C
attribute for a file of employee records. Furthermore, let
all employees in the file belong to either the Toy
department or the Sales department. Then, two type-C sub-
descriptors for DEPT will be formed as follows:
(DEPT = Toy) and (DEPT = Sales)
3
.
The Relationship of Keywords and Descriptors
A keyword is said to be derived or derivable from a
descriptor if one of the following holds:
(1) The attribute of the keyword is specified in a type-A
descriptor and the value is within the range of the
descriptor .
(2) The attribute and value of the keyword match those
specified in a type-B descriptor.





For performance reasons, records are logically
grouped into clusters based on the attribute values and
attribute value ranges in the records. As described above,
these values and value ranges are called descriptors . For
example, one cluster might contain records for those
21
employed in Columbus, making at least $20,001 but not more
than $25,000 and with at least 11 but not more than 15 years
of service. Thus records of this cluster are grouped by the
following three descriptors:
(CITY= Columbus)





These descriptors are said to define the cluster which
contains records of employees in Columbus making between
$21,000 and $22,000 per year and with 12 to 13 years
experience would require the retrieval of records in the
cluster just described. Other requests, such as to find
records of employees in Columbus making between $21,000 and
$28,000 and with 12 to 13 years experience, might require
additional retrieval of records from other clusters than the
one identified above.
In MDBS, processing is done a cluster at a time. In
order to allow efficient processing of requests, records in
a cluster are spread across all the backends. Thus each
backend needs to search only its portion of the cluster.
Given a user request, there must be a way, of course, first
to determine which clusters to search and then to determine
the location of records in a given cluster. To perform this
task, MDBS utilizes available descriptor information. For





MDBS first determines that two clusters must be searched.
These are the clusters identified by the two sets of
descriptors :










' (n = <SERVICE = <15) }
After the clusters are identified, MDBS must then determine
the disk addresses of the clusters at each backend. Finally
MDBS will cause each backend to retrieve from its disks the
records so addressed.
Descriptor search determines the descriptors that
correspond to the request. In our example, there are four
descriptors corresponding to the request; namely,
(CITY= Columbus) , ( $20 ,001 =<SALARY=<$25 , 000)
,
($25,001=<SALARY=<$30,000)
, ( 1 1 =<SERVICE=<1 5 )
.
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In order to save space and to save processing time each




!( CITY = Columbus ) D15
l( $20,001 =< SALARY =< $25,000 ) D125
!( $25,001 =< SALARY =< $30,000 ) D126
+-
1 1 =< SERVICE =< 15 ) D250
Thus the output of the descriptor search phase is the
Boolean expression of descriptor ids
D15 and (D125 or D126) and D250 (1)
corresponding to
($20,001=<SALARY=<$25K)





which identifies two clusters. The next phase, cluster
search must take the Boolean expression in (1) and actually
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determine the corresponding clusters. As with descriptors,
clusters are also identified by ids, known as cluster ids ,
for example
Descriptor Ids I
! D15, D125, D250
Cluster Id
C17
D15, D126, D250 C22
The final two phases are address generation (to find
the disk addresses, e.g., A35U6 and A3547, corresponding to
each cluster id, e.g., C17) and record selection (to
retrieve the actual records so addressed).
Descriptor search, cluster search and address
generation together form the major portion of directory
management .
Because all directory management is based on the
concept of clusters, it is also logical to design an access
control capability based on clusters. Thus cluster search is
augmented by a cluster access control mechanism.
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C. THE DATA MANIPULATION LANGUAGE
The data manipulation language for MDBS is a non-
procedural language which supports four different types of
requests - retrieve, insert, delete and update. The syntax
of these various requests and examples of them are presented
below.
1 . Retrieve Requests
A retrieve request
RETRIEVE Query Target-List [BY Attribute] [WITH Pointer]
consists of five parts. The first part is the type of the
request i.e. RETRIEVE. The second part is a query which
identifies the portion of the database to be retrieved. A
query is any arbitrary Boolean expression of predicates.
An example of a query is:
((DEPT=Toy)and(SALARY<10000) ) or
((DEPT=Book) and ( SALARY>50000)
)
The target - list is a list of elements. Each element is
either an attribute, e.g., SALARY, or an aggregate operator
to be performed on an attribute, e.g., AVG(SALARY). MDBS
supports five aggregate operators - AVG , SUM, COUNT, MAX,
MIN. The values of an attribute in the target-list are
retrieved from all records identified by the query. If no
aggregate operator is specified on the attribute in the
26
target-list, its values in all the records identified by the
query are returned directly to the user or user program. If
an aggregate operator is specified on the attribute in the
target-list, some computation is to be performed on all the
attribute values in the records identified by the query and
a single aggregate value is returned to the user or user
program. The fourth part of the request, referred to as the
BY - clause
,
is optional as designated by the square brackets
around it. The use of the By-clause is explained by means of
an example. Assume that employee records are to be divided
into groups on the basis of the departments for the purpose
of calculating the average salary for all the employees in a
department. This may be achieved by using a retrieve request
with the specific target-list, ( AVG( SALARY) ) , and the
specific BY-clause, BY DEPT. Finally, the fifth part of the
request, which is an optional WITH-clause, specifies whether
pointers to the retrieved records must be returned to the
user or user program for later use in an update request.
Some examples of retrieve requests are presented below.
Example-
1
Retrieve the names and salaries of all employees making
more than $1000/month.
RETRIEVE (FILE=Employee) and ( SALARY>5000 ) ( NAME , SALARY)
27
Example-2
List the average salary of all departments.
RETRIEVE (FILE=Employee) ( AVG ( SALARY) ) BY DEPT
2 . Insert Requests
An insert request
INSERT Record
specifies a record to be inserted into the database. An
example of an insert request is:
INSERT ( <F ILE, Employ ee>,< SALARY, 5000 >,<DEPT, Toy >)
3 . Delete Requests
A delete request is of the form:
DELETE Query
where the Query specifies the particular records to be
deleted from the database. An example of a DELETE request
is:
DELETE (NAME=Smith) or ( SALARY>50000
)
4 . Update Requests
An update request is of the form:
UPDATE Query Modifier
where the Query specifies the particular records to be
28
updated from the database and the Modifier specifies the
kinds of modification that need to be done on records that
satisfy the query. In an update request, if a single
attribute value is to be changed, then the attribute is
termed the attribute being modified The modifier in an
update request specifies the new value to be taken by the
attribute being modified. The new value to be taken by the
attribute being modified is specified as a function f of the
old value of either the same attribute or some other
attribute (say, attribute-1 ) . More specifically, the
modifier may be one of the following five types:
Type-0 : <attr ibute=constant>
Type-I : <attribute= f( attribute) >
Type-II : <attribute=f( attribute- 1 )
>
Type-Ill : <attribute=f( attribute- 1 ) of Query>
Type-IV : <attribute=f( attribute- 1 ) of Pointer>
D. THE MDBS HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE ORGANIZATION
MDBS is implemented in several permanent processes. The
process structure within the controller and each backend is
shown in Figure 2.2.
In the following two sections, we describe the functions


































Figure 2.2 - The Process Structure in the Controller and
the Backends.
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1 . Functions of the Controller
The MDBS controller consists of three categories of
functions: request preparation, insert information
generation and post processing. The request preparation
functions are those which must be performed before a request
or a transaction can be broadcasted to the backends. For
example, each request must be parsed and checked for syntax
errors before it can be broadcasted to the backends. The
insert information generation functions are those which must
be performed during the processing of an insert request to
furnish additional information required by the backends. For
example, a backend should be selected for storing the record
being inserted into the secondary storage of the backend.
The post processing functions are those which must be
performed after replies are returned from the backends, but
before the results of a request or a transaction are
forwarded to the host machine. For example, the results for
a request returned by each backend should be collected.
After receiving the results from each backend, the response
to the request can be sent to the host machine.
We note that there are no concurrency control
functions in the controller. Since user requests are
carried out by the backends, there is no need for
concurrency control in the controller. The controller must
only associate sequence numbers with the user requests.
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2. Functions of each Backend
Each backend in MDBS consists of three categories of
functions: directory management, record processing and
concurrency control. The d irectory management function
performs descriptor search, cluster search, address
generation and directory table maintenance. The record
processing function performs record storage, record
retrieval, record selection and attribute value extraction
of the retrieved records. For example, these functions
store records into the secondary storage, retrieve records
from the secondary storage and select the records that
satisfy a query from a set of records. The concurrency
control function performs operations which ensure that the
concurrent and interleaved execution of user requests will
keep the database consistent. For example, these functions
schedule a user request for execution based on the set of
clusters needed by the request. Since, in this thesis, we
deal with database security, handled in the backends, we
will next describe the functions of the backends in more
detail .
a. The Directory Management Function
Directory management has four phases: Descriptor
Search, Cluster Search, Access Control and Address
Generation. The input to directory management is either the
record part of an insert request or the query part of a
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retrieve, delete, or update request. The three non - insert
request types, namely, retrieve, delete and update, require
the same directory management processing. However, the
insert request type requires a different directory
management processing. Thus we will describe directory
management in terms of two categories: non-inserts and
inserts
.
Directory management has four directory tables:
The descriptor-to-descriptor-id table (DDIT), the attribute
table (AT), the cluster-definition table (CDT) and the
cluster-Id-to-next-backend table (CINBT) These tables are an
integrated part of the directory management. Logically,
they are defined as follows: All the descriptors defined by
the database creator are stored in the descriptor - to -
descriptor - id table (DDIT). There is a descriptor id
associated with each descriptor. There is an entry in the
attribute table (AT) for every directory attribute. A
pointer to the DDIT is stored with each directory attribute.
The pointer points to the first descriptor whose attribute
is identical to the corresponding directory attribute. A
sample AT and DDIT are depicted in Figure 2.3- By showing
these two tables together, we can easily depict the pointers
of AT. The cluster -definition table has an entry for every
cluster. Each entry consists of the cluster number, the set
of descriptor ids whose descriptors define the cluster, and
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cluster - id - to - next - backend table (CINBT) is used as a basis
of record insertion to the backends. Let us look at the
four phases of the directory management.
(1) The Descriptor Search . In this phase,
directory management determines the descriptor ids of the
descriptors that satisfy the predicates (keywords) in a
query (record). Input to Descriptor Search comes from
Request Preparation in the controller. As described in
detail in [Ref.5], if there are N backends processing a
query (record) with X predicates (keywords), then each
backend performs. descriptor search on X/N predicates
(keywords) and broadcasts the descriptor ids to the other
backends
.
(2) The Cluster Search . In this phase,
directory management determines either the cluster id of the
cluster to which a record belongs (for an insert request) or
the cluster ids of the clusters whose records may satisfy a
query (for a non-insert request). Input to Cluster Search
are the descriptor ids found by Descriptor Search in all the
backends. For insert requests. Cluster Search passes the
cluster id, if any, to Insert Information Generation in the
controller. For non-insert requests, the cluster ids are
passed to Address Generation.
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(3) The Address Generation . In this phase,
directory management determines either the secondary storage
address for storing a record when processing an insert
request or the addresses of all the records in a set of
clusters when processing a non-insert request. For insert
requests, Insert Information Generation in the controller
determines which backend is to insert the record. When a
backend is selected, Address Generation in that backend
determines the secondary storage address for record
insertion. That address and the formatted request are then
passed to Physical Data Operation.
*
.
For non-insert requests, Cluster Search
passes the cluster ids to Address Generation. Address
Generation finds the addresses of the records in these
clusters and passes the addreses and the formatted request
to Physical Data Operation.
b. The Record Processing Function
This function perform operations such as record
selection and field extraction of the retrieved records.
The names of these operations are: Physical Data Operation
and Aggregate Operation.
(1) The Physical Data Operation . Input to this
operation comes from Address Generation. The input is a set
of secondary storage addresses and the request. Physical
Data Operation performs different actions depending on the
type of the request. For an insert request, Physical Data
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Operation stores the record being inserted into the
secondary storage.
For a non-insert request, i.e., delete,
retrieve or update, Physical Data Operation fetches the
records from the secondary storage and selects the records
that satisfy the query in the request. It then performs the
intended operation on the basis of the type of the non-
insert request. For delete requests, Physical Data
Operation marks the selected records for deletion.
For retrieve requests, Physical Data
Operation extracts the values from the selected records. If
an aggregation is to be applied to the request, then
Physical data Operation passes the values to Aggregate
Operation phase of Record Processing.
For update requests, Physical Data
Operation updates the selected records and returns to the
secondary storage those updated records that have not
changed cluster. If one or more records change cluster.
Physical Data Operation marks the old records for deletion
and sends the records that have changed cluster to Request
Preparation in the controller. Request Preparation initiates
the actions required for the insertion of these records into
their new clusters.
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(2) The Aggregate Operation . This operation
performs the partial aggregate operations in retrieve
requests. Input to Aggregate Operation comes from Physical
Data Operation in the form of a set of values and the
aggregate operators to be applied. Aggregate Operation
applies the aggregate operations on the set of values and
passes the results to Post Processing in the controller.
In chapter I, we introduced the access
control systems in general. In chapter II, we gave an
overview of the structure and the attribute-based data model
of MDBS. In the next chapter, we will describe the access
control mechanism of MDBS.
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III. ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISM OF MDBS
We have seen that MDBS has four major phases for
directory management: descriptor search, cluster search,
access control and address generation. In descriptor search,
MDBS determines the descriptor-id groups which identify the
clusters requested by the user. In cluster search, MDBS
determines the cluster-ids corresponding to the descriptor-
id groups found at descriptor search. The access control
phase eliminates the unauthorized cluster-ids. Finally,
address generation determines secondary storage addresses
for the authorized clusters. In this chapter, we describe
the access control phase in more detail.
A. THE ACCESS CONTROL PRINCIPLES OF MDBS
The access control mechanism [Ref.2], has been designed
to utilize the parallel execution facilities of the
backends. Let us see the basic principles of MDBS's access
control mechanism.
1 . Access Control must Utilize the Advantages of the
MDBS Architecture
The basic idea of the MDBS architecture is to have a
multiple backend system which performance most of the
database management functions in the backends. Because of
this architectural principle, the access control mechanism
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is added to the function of the backends. Thus, we must
store the security-related information in the backends. Each
backend only needs to store the subset of tables, which are
pertinent to data stored in that backend. As a result, if
the response time and the throughput of the backend system
will be improved by parallel backend processing, then the
access control function will also be improved accordingly.
2
.
Access Control System should not Decrease Efficiency
An access control mechanism amy bring additional
overhead to a system. It might be thought that additional
access control checks on the records would slow down the
request execution. However, We do' not agree with this
observation. If we have a mechanism to distinguish the
authorized records from the unauthorized ones before record
processing, then we need not fetch the unauthorized records.
Consequently, we do not require secondary storage accesses
for unnecessary, unauthorized records. In this way, we can
improve the efficiency of the system for some requests. In
addition, this mechanism provides absolute precision and
avoids the pass-through problem.
3 Access Control System should not Provide only Static
Security Policiec for Dynamic Databases
The database creator should have an ability to
specify the protection policy for each user at database
creation time. In addition, the database creator should also
have the ability to specify the protection policy for new
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users. Since a database will not be static due to
insertion, deletion and update of records, we want to have
an access control mechanism to create new security
specifications which fit the database creator's security
policy.
U. Access Control should Provide Uniform Protection
for Record Collections of Same Characteristics
We want to protect records with the same
characteristics in the same way. Records with similar
access control requirements should be stored together and
isolated from other records with different access control
requirements. Recall that clusters are the collections of
records with uniform characteristics. We want to store
similar records together in a cluster. We can extend the
concept of clusters to handle security. If we have security
specifications on a cluster then we can protect all records
in this cluster in the same way. Such a grouping of records
has been called a security atom in chapter I. Utilization
of the security atom concept will solve the pass-through
problem also.
5. Access Control System should Provide Finer
Granularity
In request execution with access control, MDBS
should also be restrict an operation on particular records
in a cluster. For example, the access control system should
prevent the update operations, if a record in a cluster has
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a salary which is greater or equal to $2000. This feature
brings access control to the field level (i.e., the level of
att ibute-value pairs) from the cluster or record level. With
the field level access control, the mechanism provides a
finer granularity of security.
In MDBS, values of an attribute may be divided into
different ranges. Each such attribute-range pair is called
a descriptor. If we use descriptors for security
specifications, then we can protect the domain of the
attribute values of the database. Since clusters are
defined by sets of mutually exclusive descriptors on each
attribute, we can also protect the clusters by employing
their defining descriptors. Descriptors are created at the
database creation time. Thus, the security specifications
can also be created at the database time. If we want to
have finer granularity on a particular attribute for access
control, we can create descriptors with smaller attribute-
value ranges.
B. THE ACCESS CONTROL REQUIREMENTS OF MDBS
MDBS should have an access control mechanism which
protects value-dependent and pattern-sensitive information.
History-sensitive and event-sensitive information is not
considered as subject of the MDBS access control system.
State-sensitive information is dealt with concurrency
control mechanism.
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Value-dependent access control protects data on the
basis of the relationship of the attribute value of the data
and the user of the data. It is not enough to have
protection on the value of a descriptor as the finest
granularity of security. For example, the database creator
may want to allow managers to retrieve the salary of
employees in their respective departments. If we authorize
the managers to retrieve the salary of employees, then the
managers will have authorization to retrieve the salary of
all employees whether or not they are in the managers'
department. Thus, the access control must be dependent on
specific attribute value in order to provide value-dependent
security.
Another requirement for MDBS access control system is to
provide security for statistics of the database by
controlling the execution of requests which utilize the
aggregate functions such as average, maximum and minimum.
C. THE ACCESS CONTROL STEPS
The access control checks described above occur at two
disjoint times. The access control checks which are
performed before any record retrieval are considered as
pre - processing while those which are performed after the
record retrieval are considered as post - processing . As has
been stated in the second access control principle, pre-
processing is one of the goals of the access control system.
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In the next section, we discuss pre- and post-processing in
more detail ,
1 . Pre - processing
Access control checks made prior to the retrieval of
records from the secondary storage prevent the access
control mechanism from having to deal with unauthorized
records. Thus, access control precision is increased. To
achieve this goal, we have to utilize information about the
records available in the directory management, namely, the
clusters information. Thus, we should perform some access
control checks before the record processing phase and even
before the address generation phase.
In the preprocessing, the access-control checks are
related to descriptors and clusters. We can utilize the
descriptor and cluster information to perform pre-processing
by having some security specifications specified by the
database creator on the descriptors.
2 . Post - processing
We recall that the records in a database consist of
attribute-value pairs. Some of these attributes are chosen
as directory attributes. Descriptors are then defined on
these attributes in order to build clusters. The other
attributes are non-directory attributes which are not used
for defining clusters. The database creator may also want to
specify some security specifications on these attributes.
In addition, an attribute may become more important because
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of the dynamic nature of the database. The database creator
may want to specify some security specifications on this
attribute but may not want to redesign the database by
making the attribute into a directory attribute.
The non-directory attribute values of the records
are not reflected in their directories. Consequently, the
only way to determine them is to examine the attribute
values of every retrieved record. This process can be
performed after the record retrieval as a post-processing
operation.
Allowing security specifications on the non-
directory attributes degrades the precision of the access
control. If the database has no security specifications on
the non-directory attributes, then the access control system
can achieve absolute precision. Consequently, the database
creator must consider this situation. If certain attribute
values should be protected, then their attributes should be
defined as directory attributes. Nevertheless, we still want
to provide a mechanism for post-checking in order to give
flexibility to the database creator for later use of non-
directory attributes for access control of the database. The
MDBS post-processing mechanism would not affect absolute
precision severely, since there is no reason to use non-
directory attributes for security specifications at the
database creation time. It is built in for allowing
flexibility in use by the database creator.
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D. THE PREPROCESSING ACCESS CONTROL INFORMATION AS
SPECIFIED BY THE DATABASE CREATOR
In this section, we describe the preprocessing access
control information which is specified by the database
cretor at the database creation time. We also describe how
this information is stored in MDBS.
In order to decide on the authorization for a request,
we need the information concerning who can perform what
operations on which data in the database. The database
creator can specify the first two types of information
easily. For example, for specifying 'who', the database
creator can utilize user-ids which can be provided by MDBS.
For specifying 'what', the database creator can select some
of the access operations from the MDBS data manipulation
language. Specifying 'which' portion of the database is a
more elaborate exercise requiring a more detailed knowledge
of the data model. In the rest of the section, we will show
to specify a 'portion' of the database in order to give some
access rights on it.
We know that a cluster is the basic unit of access in
MDBS. As was argued in [Ref.2], we also want to utilize the
cluster as the basic unit for access control. Thus, we
expect the database creator to make some security
specifications at the cluster level. However, the database
creator is not directly awared of the cluster formation.
The database creator only specifies directory attributes and
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disjoint descriptors on these attributes. MDBS then forms
the clusters for the database creator. Consequently, we can
expect the database creator to specify the security
specifications in terms of descriptors.
We must find a way to transform the access control
descriptors (about the fields) to the authorized and
unauthorized cluster-level (about the records) This
transformation will be addressed again later in this
chapter. First we will discuss the specification and
storage of access control descriptors.
1 . Access Control Descriptors
The database creator specifies field-level access
controls on the descriptors for each user. A field - level
access control specification is a triple of the form:
(Aggregate operator, Attribute, Disallowed access operation)
The form of a field-level access control specification has
been slightly changed because of some implementation
purposes, but the basic semantics is the same as given in
[Ref .2].
The attribute in the field-level access control
specification may be a directory or a non-directory
attribute. The dissallowed access operation is one of the
set { No_Retrieve , No_Delete, No_Insert, No_update}. The
aggregate operator is one of the aggregate operators of the
MDBS data manipulation language (e.g.. Max, Avg, Sum etc.).
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The aggregate operator may be omitted in the specification.
The attribute is not necessary for a field-level access
control when the disallowed access operation is No_Insert or
No_Delete, since we insert and delete the whole record not
only an attribute of the record.
A security specification (ss) for a descriptor may
be 'all' or 'null' or a collection of field-level access
control specifications. A ss of 'all' indicates that all
accesses are disallowed for the respective user. A ss of
'null' indicates that no accesses are disallowed for the
respective user. The ss on a descriptor D is the collection
of field-level access control specifications for the
descriptor D. It can be represented as follows:
(D) {<Aggr_op, Attr id, dissallowed access op>,< >
< >T
For example, we might have the following
descriptor-ss for the descriptor D : (9<Salary< 1 00 ) is
(D) { <
—















— ,No Insert> }
The meaning of this security specification is as
follows: if a record has a salary between zero and 100, then
the user can not update the job attribute of the record. Nor
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can the user retrieve the average value of salaries and Name
of the employees of all the records whose salaries are in
the range of zero and 100. In addition, the deletion and
insertion of any record with salary between and 100 is not
authorized .
We store all the descriptor-based security
specifications for each user in a descriptor - to - security -
specification table (DSST). This table and its
implementation are discussed in the next two subsections
2. The Descriptor - to -Security - Specification Table
( DSST )
Logically, DSST can be incorporated into an
augmented DDIT by adding to DDIT one column per user. See
Figure 3.1 below. Instead, we would like to store the
descriptor-level access conrol information in a seperate
descriptor - to - security - specification table as shown in
Figure 3.2.
There are several reasons to have a seperate table.
First, the descriptor-based security specifications are
database-creator-specified access control information and
are used to create cluster-level access control information.
They are not used directly for request authorization. We
have decided that MDBS would use cluster-level access
control information for request authorization. Such
cluster-level access control information is created once, at
the database creation time. It is used whenever we need to
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Descrl Descriptor I SS 1 SS
id 1 1 for user-1 I for user-2
D1 1 0<Salary=<100 I {<Avg, Salary ,No_Retrieve>} 1 none
D2 |0>Salary>100 !{< ,Name, No_update>} ! all
• ••1 1 •••• )•••
Figure 3 • 1 An augmented DDIT
Des-id SS for user 1 SS for user 2
D1
D2
{ <Avg jSalary ,No_retrieve>
}
{< ,Name, No update>}
none
all
Figure 3.2 A separate Descriptor-to-Secur ity-
Specif ication Table (DSST)
deal with that cluster. The descriptor-level access control
information is then no longer used directly.
The second reason for a seperate DSST is that these
security specifications are of variable length whereas the
DDIT entries are of fixed length. Consequently, it is more
appropriate to separate variable length entries from fixed
length length entries, if we do not use them at the same
time in an operation.
The third reason for a separate DSST is that each
user may have a distinct ss on a descriptor. All these
distinct security specifications must be stored. If the
database has a large number of users,' then the main function
of DDIT which is 'the mapping from descriptor to
descriptor-id' will be very inefficient.
3 . The Secondary - Storage - Based DSST
Each user in the database will have a column in DSST
as depicted in Figure 3.2. If the database has a large
number of users, then we may want to store the DSSTs in the
secondary storage. Except as discussed in Chapter V, we use
the DSST only at the database load time to create the
cluster-based security specifications. Thus, it will be
efficient to store the DSST in the backends' secondary
storage. We can just fetch the particular user's DSST or
part of the DSST when it is needed.
Figure 3-3 shows a sample of the secondary-storage
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Figure 3-3 The Secondary-Storage-Based DSST
table in the backends' main memory. The user-index will have
a pointer to the DSST entry for each user.
In the DSST, we deal with the descriptor-ids rather
than the descriptor boundary values. This gives us the
opportunity to use a simple layered indexing technique with
variable length security specification entries.
4 . The Cluster - level Access Control Information
After the database creator has defined the
descriptors and the descritor-level access control
information, then the database loading mechanism can create
the clusters and the cluster-level access control
information.
A cluster has been defined by a set of descriptors.
The cluster-based security specifications are the union of
the corresponding descriptor-based security specifications
in the cluster. Consequently, the descriptor-based security
specifications and the cluster-based security specifications
can be represented in the same way. If the cluster is
defined by only one descriptor, then the cluster-based
security specification and the descriptor-based security
specification will be the same. If the cluster is defined
by more than one descriptor, then the union of the
descriptor-based security specifications will be the
cluster-based security specification.
Let us illustrate how to obtain the cluster-level
access control information from a set of descriptor-based
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security specifications. Consider the database with four
employee records depicted in Figure 3 • '^ • The database
creator first specifies some of the attributes as the
directory attributes and then specifies some descriptors on
the basis of these attributes. This information is stored in
the DDIT (Figure 3.5). In this example, the attributes,
Salary and Department, have been specified as the directory
attributes. The attribute of the descriptors D1 and D2 is
Salary and descriptors D3 and D4 is Department. In addition,
the database creator defines descriptor-level access control
information on each descriptor for every user in the
database. This information is stored in the DSST (Figure
3.6). Now, the database creator has provided necessary
information for the directory management and the access
control mechanism. Using the entries and the information in
the DDIT, MDBS can form clusters and this information is
stored in the CDT (Figure 3.7).
With the descriptors corresponding to a cluster (in
CDT) and the descriptor-based security specifications
corresponding to the descriptors (in DSST), we can determine
those security specifications corresponding to the cluster
and store them in the cluster-to-cluster-based-security-
specification table (CSST)(See Figure 3.8). For example in
Figure 3.8, the cluster-1 is defined by the descriptors D1
and D3. In Figure 3.6, the descriptor-based security





I Employee I Department_no I Salary iManager
1 ! 12 ! 1 ! 1000 I 12
2 1 13 ! 1 I 1500 ! 12
3 ! 14 1 2 I 1200 I 14
U I 15 ! 2 I 2000 i 1U
Figure 3.4 A Sample Database with four Employee Records
Descriptor id ! Descriptor
D1 ! 1500 <= Salary
D2 I 1500 < Salary < -
D3 I Department_1
D4 1 Department_2
Figure 3.5 Descr iptor-to-Descriptor_Id Table
for the Database of Figure 3.4.
S6
1 — 1
Descr id I Descriptor-ss ! Descriptor-s
1 for user_1 ' for user_2
D1 ! NONE I NONE




D3 1 NONE 1 {<— ,Name,No_Update>}
D4 1 {<— ,Name,No_Delete>} ! NONE
Figure 3.6 A Descriptor-to-Secur ity-Specif ication
Table (DSST) ' ' '
Cluster_id Set of descriptors
——
— — — — —
——— "-~~ —
—
— — — — —
—
—
records in the cluster
1 { D1,D3 } R1 ,R2
2 { D1 ,D4 } R3
3 { D2,D3 } —
4 { D2,D4 } R4
Figure 3.7 The Cluster Definition Table (CDT) for




id [Specifications for user-1 [Specifications for user-2
1 ( NONE [ {<--,Name,No_Update>}





3 I {<Avg ,Salary ,No Retrieve>}[ < , Name, No Update>}








Figure 3.8 Cluster-to-Cluster-Secur ity-Specif ication
Table (CSST) for the databese of Figure 3.4.
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are 'none'. Consequently, the cluster-based security
specification on the cluster-1 for user_1 will be 'none'.
User_2 has descriptor-based security specifications as
'none' for descriptor D1 and {<
—
, Name , No_Update> } for
descriptor D3. Consequently, the cluster-based security
specification on cluster-1 for user_2 will be {<
—
, Name , No_Update> } . By repeating this process, for every
cluster and every user in the database, the cluster-level
access control information can be determined.
5 . The Cluster - to - Cluster - Based - Security Specification
Table ( CSST )
The cluster-level access control information is
stored in an augmented_CDT which is the CDT with an
additional column for user-cluster-based security
specifications. Each user has an augmented CDT. The
augmented CDT is used in the cluster search, access control
and address generation phases of directory management.
In the cluster search phase, the cluster-ids for
those clusters whose records may satisfy a request are
determined. In the access control phase, the cluster-ids
whose records are not authorized for the user are determined
and the unauthorized cluster-ids are eliminated. In the
address generation phase, the secondary storage addresses of
the authorized clusters are determined.
In [Ref.6], the access control information has not
been considered. The CDT, without access control
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information, has been implemented as two secondary-storage-
based tables. The first table is the descr iptor - to -
descriptor - id - bit -map table (DCBMT). The second table is the
cluster - id - to - secondary - storage - address table (CSSAT).
DCBMT is used for the cluster search phase and CSSAT is
used for the address generation phase. We will store the
access control information of CDT in a third secondary-
storage-based table called the cluster - to - cluster - based -
security - specification table ( CSST ) .
6 . The Secondary - Storage - Based CSST
Since each user needs only one CSST, we will need to
store CSSTs in the secondary storage. We will store the
user-index in the main memory of the backends and we will
have one pointer for each user's CSST tableCFigure 3.9).
CSST utilizes the cluster-ids for indexing. The
user-CSST pointer leads to the cluster-index for that user.
The cluster-index cells have upper and lower cluster-id
value. We look for the cluster-index cells whose values
cover the cluster-id in consideration. Each cluster-index
has a pointer which leads us to the cluster-based-security-
specification set. The cluster-level access control
information is stored in the corresponding cluster-based-
security-specification set cells. Each entry in the set has
space for a certain number of field-level access controls.
If there are two many field-level access controls, then some
will be stored in an overflow block which can be found by
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User index
















Figure 3.9 The Secondary-Storage-Based CSST
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In this chapter, we will describe in more detail the
preprocessing of the requests utilizing the access control
information. As in the other phases of directory
management, the access control mechanism distinguishes
between insert requests and non-insert requests
( retrieve , update and delete). The difference between an
insert request and a non-insert request is that the insert
request deals with only one cluster at a time while the
non-insert request may deal with many clusters at the same
time. In the following two sections, we will, in turn,
describe the preprocessing for non-insert and insert
requests
.
A. PRE-PROCESSING FOR NON-INSERT REQUESTS
Directory management with access control has four
phases; descriptor search, cluster search, access control
and address generation. Directory management starts with
descriptor search which finds the descriptor-id groups for
the request. Then cluster search finds the cluster-ids for
the corresponding descriptor-id groups. When all cluster-ids
are obtained for the request, access control checks are made
in order to produce a list of authorized cluster-ids.
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Since access control for the non-insert requests works
on clusters, we can utilize the cluster-level access control
information for the request authorization. The request
authorization is performed in two steps. The first step is
cluster security specification search and the second step is
cluster authorization decision
. In the following two
subsections, we will elaborate these two request
authorization steps.
1 . Cluster Security Specification Search
Cluster security specification search for a non-
insert request begins with a list of cluster-ids for
clusters to be authorized. We will use the cluster-based
security specifications, stored in the CSST (Figure 3.9), as
the access control information. CSST has three layers of
indexing; user-index, cluster-index and cluster security
specification set (cs-set). The user-index may be stored in
the main memory, while the rest of the table is stored in
the secondary storage. An algorithm to search CSST is as
follows
.
After the cluster search phase, for the cluster-ids
found, the access control phase is started. First, the
access control mechanism refers to the backend's main memory
and finds the particular user-id in the user-index. The
user-index shows us whether the user can access the database
or not. If the user is not authorized to access the
database, then the request is rejected. If the user is
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authorized to access the database, then a pointer to the
cluster-index is fetched from the user-index. Thus, the
first layer indexing (the user-index) allows us to check the
user-access rights to the database.
With the pointer found in the user-index, the first
block of the cluster-index is fetched from the secondary
storage. Each cluster-index block has cells which have one
upper and one lower bound cluster-id, and one pointer. If a
cluster-id is between the upper and lower bounds of a cell,
then we say that the cell covers this cluster-id. The
pointer in the cell leads us to the cs-set which has its
clusters covered by the corresponding cell. For example, in
Figure 3.9, the first cell of the cluster-index has lower
bound as CI and upper bound as Ck. Consequently, The
cluster-ids between CI and Ck are covered by this cell and
the pointer in this cell leads us to the corresponding cs-
set block for these clusters. The above procedure is
repeated for each cluster-id yielding a pointer to the cs-
set for each of the corresponding clusters.
It can be observed that the strategy to search CSST
is to search it one layer at a time. For each block fetched,
the corresponding operations are performed for all clusters.
This strategy prevents redundant accesses to the CSST
blocks
.
The next step is to search all the cs-sets. Recall
that each cs-set block stores the access control information
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for a certain number of clusters. Each cluster in the cs-set
has spaces for a part of the security specification which is
a certain number of field-level access controls. If a
cluster has more field-level access controls, then they are
stored in an overflow block which can be reached with a
pointer .
The cs-set blocks are searched one at a time,
starting with the cs-set block for the cluster with the
smallest cluster-id. A cs-set block is searched for all
clusters we are dealing with. After the processing of the
cs-sets are completed for all clusters, additional field-
level access controls for clusters are fetched from overflow
blocks utilizing the pointer obtained in the cs-set.
2. The Cluster Authorization Decision
The cluster-based security specification for each
cluster to be authorized has been provided from CSST in the
cluster security specification search. Now, the access
control mechanism should utilize the user request and the
cluster-based security specifications in order to decide
about the cluster authorization for the request.
In [Ref.3], the relationships among the disallowed
access operations in order to prevent compromising the
access control mechanism are described. These









The determination of the security specification for
each cluster to be authorized is the same for all types of
non-insert requests. However, the processing of this
information for each type of request is, of course,
different. This processing will be described in the next
three subsections.
a. The Authorization for Retrieve Requests
The syntax of a retrieve request is:
RETRIEVE Query Target-List [BY Attribute]
Where the query is any arbitrary Boolean expression of
predicates which identifies the portion of the database to
be retrieved. The target - list is a list of elements. Each
element is either an attribute, e.g., SALARY, or an
aggregate operator to be performed on an attribute, e.g.,
AVG(SALARY). We support five aggregate operators - AVG , SUM,
COUNT, MAX, MIN - in MDBS. Let us have an example using the
database in Figure 3.^. The retrieve request could be as
follows
.





The meaning of the above request is to retrieve
the average salary of the employees who are in department 2.
Let us assume that directory management has performed
descriptor search and cluster search. Determining that
clusters C2 and C4 may contain records satisfying the
request. The access control mechanism performs the cluster
security specification search for user-1 as described in the
previous section and finds the security specifications from
the CSST (see Figure 3.8) as follows:
(C2) {< ,-— ,No_Delete>}
(C4) {<Avg, Salary, No_Retrieve> ,< , ,No_Delete>}
The request calls for retrieving the salaries of
the records in cluster C2 and cluster C4. User-1 does not
have any contradictory security specification for retrieval
of cluster C2, since cluster C2 has a security specification
which only restricts the deletion of records. This check
operation is performed as follows. The access control
mechanism compares the attribute in the security
specification, which is null, and the attribute in the
target-list part of the request (i.e. salary). Since they do
not match, it authorizes the cluster. In the case of cluster
C4, the security specification has two field-level access
controls. Let us consider the first field-level access
control. The aggregate operator of both the field-level
access control and the request match (i.e. average). In
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addition, the attribute of both the field-level access
control and the request match. Now, the access control
mechanism checks the disallowed access operation. Since it
is No_Retrieve, the request is not authorized to retrieve
the records of cluster C4 . As a result only the cluster C2
is authorized for this request and the user is warned as
only authorized records have been retrieved.
Let us now consider a slightly different request
as follows:
RETRIEVE (File=Employee) and ( Department=2) (Salary)
The query in the request is the same as in the previous
example. However, the target-list calls for retrieving the
salaries of particular employees instead of the average
salary. Since the query is the same as in the previous
example, clusters C2 and C4 will again be the satisfying
clusters. In the first field-level access control for
cluster C4 , we see that the retrieval of the average salary
is not authorized. But here we want to retrieve only the
individual salaries. Now, we will have an access control
implication: if a request with an aggregate operator is not
authorized, then the same request without aggregate operator
will also not be authorized. Thus, for example, if the
retrieval of the average salary is not authorized, then the
retrieval of the individual salaries is also not authorized.
The inverse of this implication is not true. That is, even
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if we have restriction the retrieval of salaries, retrieval




Salary , No_Retrieve> > <
,
Salary , No_Retrieve>
< jSalary , No_Retrieve> -/-> <Avg
,
Salary , No_Retrieve>
We can add this rule to the access control implications as
the fifth access control implication. We should recall that
the aggregate operations are used only in retrieve requests.
The fifth access control implication can be stated more
formally as follows. . ' '
<Agg-op , Attr-A , access op-3> > <Agg-op
,
Attr-A , access op-B>
b. The Authorization for Delete Requests
The syntax of a delete request is:
DELETE Query
where the query specifies the particular records which will
be deleted from the database. Let us consider an example for
a delete request from user-1.
DELETE ( Fi le= Employee) and (Salary= 1000)
User-I wants to delete those employee records
which have salary as $1000. The query has only one predicate
which is covered by the descriptor D1 (see Figure 3.5).
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Consequently, cluster CI (defined by descriptor D1 and D3)
and cluster C2 (defined by descriptor D1 and D4) contain
records which may satisfy the request since they have
records with salary less than or equal to $1500.
The cluster security specification search of the
CSST shown in Figure 3.8 finds the security specifications





Cluster CI does not have any security related restriction.
Consequently, we can reach the records R1 and R2 (See CDT in
Figure 3.7). We should recall that cluster CI contains those
records which have salary less than or equal to $1500; but,
the request needs only those records with salary equal to
$1000, in this case record R1.
According to the security specification for
cluster C2, the user is not authorized to delete a record in
cluster C2. Consequently, the delete request for cluster C2
is rejected. In addition, according to the access control
implications, even if the dissallowed access operation were
No_Retrieve or No_Update, then cluster Z2 would be
unauthorized. As a result, only the record R1 in cluster CI
will be deleted.
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c. The Authorization for Update Requests
The syntax of an update request is:
UPDATE Query Modifier
where the query specifies the records to be updated and the
modifier specifies the update operation. Five basic modifier
types have been specified in [ref.4] and briefly described
in chapter 2. Each of the modifier types try to alter the
value of one attribute. Since the security specifications
specify the disallowed access operation for the attributes,
we can have an authorization decision immediately after we
find out the attribute to be modified.
Let us consider an example of an update by
user-2
.
UPDATE ( File=Employee) and (Dept=2) and ( Sal ary> 1500)
<Salary=Salary+50>
User-2, with this request, wants to increase by
$50 the salary of those employees who are in Department 2
and have salary greater or equal to $1500. Cluster search
determines the satisfying cluster as only cluster C2, which
is defined by descriptors D2 and D4. Cluster C2 has the
security specification with only one field-level access






The access control mechanism compares the attribute in the
each field-level access control of the security
specification (here Salary) and the attribute in the
modifier (here again Salary). If they did not match, then
the cluster would be authorized. Since they match, the
access control mechanism looks at the dissallowed access
operation. Since the dissallowed access operation is
No_Update, the cluster is not authorized. Here, we have only
one satisfying cluster for the query and this cluster is
unauthorized. Thus, the request will be rejected. If the
dissallowed access operation were No_Retrieve or No_Delete,
then the request would also be rejected because of the
access control implication rules.
In the previous sections, we have described the
preprocessing for non-insert requests. In the following
section, we will describe the preprocessing for insert
requests
.
B. PREPROCESSING FOR THE INSERT REQUESTS
The MDBS data manipulation language specifies the insert
request as follows:
INSERT <Request>
where the Request is of the form {< Attribute ,Value> , <-->,
..., <— >}. As stated previously an insert request differs
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from non-insert requests because it refers to a single
unique cluster. The actual processing of an insert request
depends on whether or not this cluster already exists. In
the following subsections, we will describe the
preprocessing of an insert request in detail using the
following example:




1 . Insert Requests for an Existing Cluster
In the case of an insert request, descriptor search
may be performed by more than one backend, but the actual
insertion will be done by only one backend. If the cluster
already exists, i.e., already contains other records, then
the backend will also have the cluster-level access control
information in its CSST. The access control process for the
insert request with an existing cluster is performed only by
the one backend which is to perform the actual insertion
operation. The access control mechanism in this backend
handles this kind of insert request the same as a non-insert
request with one cluster.
At the end of the descriptor search, the satisfying
descriptor-id group is determined. The cluster-id search
will determine the unique cluster-id from CDT for the
descriptor-id group. The backend, chosen for the insertion,
will perform the cluster security specification search on
this cluster-id. This search is the same as the cluster
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security specification search described for a non-insert
request. Having been provided the security specification for
the cluster and the user-id, the access control mechanism
will check the authorization on the request. If the security
specification does not have any disallowed access operation
as No_Insert, then the request will be authorized.
Let us now consider the example insert request for
the database in Figure 3.^. The user wants to insert an
employee record for an employee, who will have salary of
$1250 and who will be in department 1. In descriptor
search, the satisfying descriptor on attribute Salary is
found as descriptor D1
,
since descriptor D1 covers all of
the salaries which are less than or equal to $1500 (see
Figure 3.5). The descriptor for the attribute department is
found as descriptor D3. Thus, the descriptor-id group for
this request is descriptors D1 and D3. In the cluster-id
search, directory management searches the CDT (see Figure
3.7) for the descriptor-id group and the cluster is found to
be cluster CI. After this point, processing is the same as
the access control phase of non-insert requests. The
security specification for cluster-1 will be searched from
the CSST and the security specification will be examined for
authorization of the request.
2. Insert Requests into the Empty Cluster
A second case occurs if all of the descriptors for
the insert are already defined, but this insert is the first
75
one for the cluster defined by this descriptor-id group. In
this case, no information about the cluster can be found in
the directory. Consequently, we can not find any cluster-
based security specifications for this cluster. However,
since all of the descriptors are the existing descriptors,
we can find the descriptor-level access control information
in DSST. Thus, we can derive the cluster-level access
control information from the descriptor-level access control
information as described in the algorithm in section III-D-
4.
The descriptor-based security specifications for
each descriptor are fetched from DSST. The union of the
descriptor-based security specifications is stored in CSST
as the cluster-based security specification for this
cluster. After this point, the authorization step for the
request is performed as before. Thus, for example, if one of
the disallowed access operations in the cluster-based
security specification is No_Insert, then the request is
rejected .
The method described above has an efficiency
problem. We derive the cluster-based security
specification, store it in CSST and then perform the
authorization decision. If the insertion is authorized,
then the record is inserted. If it is not authorized, then
the insertion is rejected. In this case, the effort to
update the CSST has been performed even though no insert
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actually occurs. We should find a better solution to
overcome this inefficiency.
We reject an insert request if the dissallowed
access operation in a descriptor-based security
specification is No_Insert. During the DSST search, we can
check the dissallowed access operation for each descriptor.
If we find a dissallowed access operation of No_Insert in a
descriptor-based security specification, then the request
can be rejected immediately. In this case no update to the
CSST will be performed. If none of the descriptor-based
security specifications has the disallowed access operation
of No_Insert, then the request is authorized and the CSST
can be updated accordingly,
3. Insert Requests into a new Cluster
A third case arises if the request needs to create a
new descriptor. In this case not only will the cluster not
exist, but there will be no descriptor-level access control
information for this new descriptor. Thus, of course, we
can not derive the cluster-level access control information
as was described in the last section.
Insert requests with a new descriptor introduce two
new problems. The first is 'Who can create a new
descriptor?' The second is 'How can the descriptor-based
security specification for the new descriptor be
specified?'. The first question must be answered prior to
the actual request authorization. Consequently, the access
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control process for the insert request with a new descriptor
can be divided into three phases; the new descriptor
creation authorization, the access control information
specification for the new descriptor and the total request
authorization .
In the initial access control design in [Ref.3], the
problem created by a new descriptor has not been addressed.




V. INSERT REQUESTS WITH THE NEW DESCRIPTORDS
In chapter U, we described the preprocessing for insert
and non-insert requests utilizing the cluster-level and the
descriptor-level access control information developed in
chapter 3. At the end of chapter 4, we described an insert
request with a new descriptor and observed that there was no
access control information at the cluster-level or the
descriptor-level for this kind of request. In this chapter,
we will describe the access control information and the
access control methods for insert requests with a new
descriptor. Let us look first at what the reason is to have
a new descriptor.
A. THE REASON FOR THE NEW DESCRIPTOR
The database creator specifies the descriptors for Type
A and Type B attributes as an upper limit and a lower limit
on the attribute value. Thus, we never need to create a Type
A or Type B descriptor, since the value of the predicate
attribute will fall within the boundaries of the
descriptors. However, if the attribute is of Type C, then
each value ot the Type C attribute will result in a distinct
descriptor. For example, if attribute Department is of Type
C, then Department TOY and Department SALES are the distinct
descriptors. Since each value of the Type C attribute
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results in a Type C descriptor, there may be some values
which are not defined as descriptors by the database
creator. For example, if Department ADVERTISING has not
been defined earlier but we want to create a new department
as ADVERTISING then we create a new Type C descriptor on the
Type C attribute department. We may even need to create more
than one Type C descriptor for an insert request.
B. THE AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR A REQUEST WITH A NEW
DESCRIPTOR
In the directory management processing without access
control, the new descriptors are created and broadcasted by
the controller. This process is done as follows. In the
descriptor search phase, if the backend can not find the
descriptor for a predicate, then it looks at the type of the
predicate attribute. If the attribute is of Type C and the
request is an insert request, then it sends a message to the
controller to create a new Type C descriptor. The controller
creates a new descriptor and broadcasts it to the all
backends. The backends receive the new descriptor and store
it into the proper tables.
Directory management with access control requires us to
add two more steps to the process described above. The first
step is 'the authorization step for the new descriptor' and
the second is 'the descriptor-level access control
specification for the new descriptor'. What will be the
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order for these steps? New descriptor creation is a costly
process in terms of the number of messages among the
backends and the controller. Thus, we will try to to avoid
the unnecessary creation of a descriptor. Obviously, the
new descriptor authorization checks will be performed before
the new descriptor creation. Total request authorization
also depends on the other descriptors' security
specifications as well, we should refer to DSST to check the
security specifications for all of the descriptors in the
cluster .
Another necessary operation is to specify some
descriptor-based security specifications for the new
descriptor. The new descriptor's security specification is
specified and stored in DSST, and the cluster-based security
specification is derived from all of the descriptors'
security specifications.
Now, we know what we should do for the insert request
with a new descriptor. The order of the operations and the
methods for the operations must still be determined. In the
following sections, we will elaborate the steps of the
process in order to see and assess the various choices.
These steps are the new descriptor-creation authorization,
the new descriptor creation operation, the descriptor-level
access control specification for the new descriptor, the
authorization decision for the old descriptors and the
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cluster-level access control information derivation for the
new cluster.
C. THE MEW DESCRIPTOR CREATION AUTHORIZATION
We know that each value of a Type C attribute is
considered for a distinct Type C sub-descriptor. If
department and job are specified as Type C attributes, then
each values of one of these attributes is also the value of
a distinct Type C sub-descriptor. The creation of a new
department defines a new descriptor. Another example can be
to add a new job to the system. The access control question
for this kind of operation can be stated more formally as
'who is the person allowed to create a new descriptor on
this attribute?'. This question can be answered by the
database creator at the database creation time, since it
depends on the basic organizational schema.
In MDBS, deletion and creation of an attribute is not
allowed after the database is first created. Since the
attributes are permanent, we can give some security
specifications on the attribute-level for the future
descriptor-creation authorizations. These security
specifications will be on Type C attributes for each user in
the database. We store the user - descriptor - creation





The New- Descriptor - Authorization Table ( NDAT )
We store the descriptor-creation authorizations for
each user on the Type C attributes in this table (Figure
5.1). The descriptor-creation authorization on each Type C
attribute for user i is a boolean expression. In Figure
5.1, we can see that creation of a new department is
authorized for user 2 but not for user 1.
2. The Secondary Memory Based NDAT
We may want to store NDAT in the secondary storage,
since the dimension of NDAT depends on the number of the
users in the database which may be large. Figure 5.2 shows a
NDAT with secondary-based implementation.
The entries of NDAT are the user-ids. Only the
authorized Type C attributes for the new descriptors are
listed in NDAT. Thus, each user will have a variable length
entry with the attribute-ids in it. We may not want to use
well-structured indexed or B-Tree constructions for this
table, since the number of the Type C attributes in the
database is not large. In addition, most of the users will
have creation authorization only for a subset of these
attributes. In Figure 5.2, we can see that user 1 can
create some new descriptors on the attributes which are








! User_1 I User_2 ! I User_n
Attr! Creation
I
Creation 1 1 Creation
ID I Authorization I Authorization! I Authorization
Dept! NO ! YES
I I
Job ! YES ! NO ! I
• •I •••••• I •••• I ••••••I
Figure 5.1 New Descriptor Authorization Table (NDAT)
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Figure 5.2 The Secondary-Memory-Based Implementation
of New Descriptor Authorization Table (NDAT)
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D. NEW DESCRIPTOR CREATION TIME
We know that the request authorization for the insert
requests with the new descriptor depends on either the new
descriptor-creation authorization or the access
authorization for the old descriptors. The new descriptor-
creation authorization can be performed before the creation.
If we create a new descriptor and the request is denied
because of the old descriptors' security specifications,
then we will have an unused, unnecessary descriptor.
Let us consider the following insert request for user 1
:
INSERT {<Salary,2000>,<Job,SALESMAN>,<Dept,T0Y>}
where both attribute Department and attribute Job are Type C
attributes and the predicate values, TOY and SALESMAN, do
not exist as descriptors. Thus, new Type C descriptors
should be created, TOY for the attribute Department, and
SALESMAN for the attribute Job, respectively.
Assume there are three or more backends and descriptor
search for predicate 1,2 and 3 will be performed by backend
1,2 and 3, respectively. Thus, backend 1 performs
descriptor search on the attribute Salary and finds the
corresponding descriptor. On the other hand, backend 2 can
not find descriptors for attribute Job with the value
SALESMAN. Backend 2 looks at the type of the attribute Job
and finds out that it is a Type C attribute. Consequently,
backend 2 wants to create a ne i Job as SALESMAN. Now,
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backend 2 has to check whether or not user 1 is authorized
to create a new job. Backend 2 performs the new
descriptor-creation-authorization checks for user 1 on
attribute Job. This operation is performed as follows. The
NDAT block for user 1 is fetched from the secondary memory
via the pointer provided in the user-index for user 1. We
search the block to find the attribute Job. Since Job is in
the block, we conclude that user 1 is authorized to create a
new job. Thus, backend 2 requests a new descriptor, namely
SALESMAN, from the controller. The controller creates a new
descriptor and broadcasts it to all backends.
Similarly, backend 3 performs descriptor search on the
attribute Department and finds out that no descriptor exists
for TOY. It performs the new descriptor-creation-
authorization check on attribute Department for user 1.
Since attribute Department is not indicated in the NDAT
block for user 1 , user 1 is not authorized to create a new
department. The request must be totaly rejected. Now, we
have created a descriptor, namely SALESMAN, but we could not
insert the record. Thus, we have a descriptor for a name not
in the database. In addition, we have wasted an effort for
the new descriptor creation which is costly. The same
problem would also arise with predicate 1. If the user does
not have an access right for insertion of the records which
have salary of $2000. Some possible strategies to avoid
this problem are described in following sections.
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1.
Method -1 for new Descriptor Creation
This method tries to create the new descriptor as
the last step. Each backend first tries to decide about the
creation authorization for the new descriptor and the access
authorization for the old descriptors. If everything is
authorized, then the backend sends a status message to the
other backends. After receiving the status messages from all
the backends, we can conclude that the request is authorized
and we can demand new descriptors. The controller creates
the new descriptors and broadcasts them to the backends.
2 Method -2 for new Descriptor Creation
The problem with method-1 is efficiency, since each
backend has to wait for all status messages before
requesting a new descriptor creation. Method-2 allows the
backends to create a new descriptor whenever it is needed,
and if the request is denied, then the new descriptors are
deleted
.
The new descriptor deletion operation is requested
by the creator backend from the controller. The controller
deletes the new descriptor and broadcasts a deletion message
to the backends.
This method is also inef
f
icienct . In the worst case,
if there are N backends in the system, then we need N
additional messages from the backends for deletion and one
broadcast message from the controller. In addition, we will
have some deletion overhead in the controller.
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3 . Method -3 for new Descriptor Creation
Method-3 also allows the backends to create a new
descriptor whenever it is needed. The controller creates a
new descriptor by assigning a descriptor-id and it does not
keep track of the value of descriptors. Thus, if the
backends do not store the new descriptors into DDIT and into
other tables, then there is no way to reach them again. If
the backend needs the same descriptor for a later request,
then the controller will assign another descriptor-id for
this descriptor regardless of its prior existence. The only
problem for this method is an increase of the number of
descriptor-ids because of some nonexistent descriptors.
M . The Sequence of an Insert Request with the Superior
Method
Method-1 is superior to others in terms of the
uniform handling of the problem, the lack of side effects
(e.g., the artificial descriptor-id increase seen in
method-3) and relatively modest overhead. Let us elaborate
method-1 and see the complete sequence for an insert
request
.
Directory Management receives the request and
performs AT search for each predicate assigned to that
backend. If there are Type C attribute in the request, then
they are locked, and descriptor search is performed for each
predicate, as follows. For each predicate, the backend
reads the DDIT, finds the attribute and the proper
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descriptors on this attribute. If the attribute type is Type
C and there is no descriptor for this attribute with this
particular predicate value, then we need to create a new
Type_C descriptor with this predicate value. The backend
looks at NDAT in order to check "creation authorization" for
the user on this predicate attribute. If the user is
authorized to create a new descriptor on this attribute,
then the backend continues descriptor search for the next
predicate. If the user is not authorized to create a new
descriptor on this attribute, then we deny the whole
request
.
After descriptor search is done for all predicates,
the backend broadcasts them and waits to get descriptor-ids
from the other backends. With this broadcast message, the
backend sends a flag indicating that a new descriptor is to
be created.
The processing for any type of insert request is the
same until this point. There may be two cases at this
point. The first case is that no backend needs to create a
new descriptor, i.e., this is an insert request with an
existing or empty cluster. The second case is that one or
more backends need to create a new descriptor. We have
elaborated the first case in the chapter 3. Let us consider
the sequence of processing for the insert request with a new
descriptor after this point.
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The backends start "descriptor-level access control
process" on the descriptors that they have broadcasted.
There is no cluster for this request available to be
inserted into and to be checked for cluster-level access
control information. We have not yet created the new
descriptor. We delay the creation until after the descriptor
level access control process.
Let us look at the descriptor-level access control
process, which is the same as for an insert request with the
empty cluster. There is only one descriptor-id group for
the request since insert requests have only one cluster. If
we check user authorization for each descriptor and each of
the descriptors contains positive insert authorizations,
then we can deduce that the request is authorized. This
process is performed by all of the backends. After positive
authorization decision is completed, the backends which need
new descriptors request new descriptors from the controller.
When the controller sends a new descriptor creation message,
the backends start to store this new desriptor in the proper
tables, and they create a new cluster and the cluster-level
access control information.
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E. THE ACCESS CONTROL INFORMATION SPECIFICATION FOR THE NEW
DESCRIPTORS
We still have to find an answer for the question "Who
can access to a cluster which is defined by this new
descriptor"? For example, if the new descriptor is a new
department, namely, TOY, then the question will be 'who can
read the salaries of the employees in this department and
who can not?'. Can we decide about this specification in
advance? Let us elaborate some choices for answers to this
question .
1 . Method
_1_ for the Access Control- Specification for a
new Descriptor
This method requires the database creator to specify
all security specifications at the database creation time.
We have already decided that the new Type C-descriptor-
creation authorizations for each user would be specified at
the database creation time. Now, we have to ask 'can we
also specify the user access authorizations on this new
descriptor at the database creation time?'. In some cases
it may be possible. For example, the director of a
department will have right to read 'new employee's salary'.
This is very appropriate in terms of a static security
policy. However, we may not be able to predict all
necessary security specifications for new descriptors in
advance. For example, suppose we want to create a new
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department which is a totally new managerial decision. It is
possible that it does not fit into the regular policies
specified in advance. Thus, we will need some additional
security specifications. Thus, the solution for this
problem may be to specify clear and available security
specifications at the database creation time and to use the
database administrator/creator's security specification
facilities to change or add new security specifications
later
.
2 . Method 2 for the Access Control Specification for _a
new Descriptor
It is clear that we may not be able to specify all
security specifications for some specific descriptors at the
database creation time. If we have the flexibility to
specify some security specifications after descriptor
creation time, then we will have an additional problem of
dealing with an insecure gap between the descriptor creation
time and new access control information specification time.
We may not want to specify the new security specifications
at the new descriptor creation time in the same insert
request, since such a specification will be too slow for the
insert requests. This gap must be covered by an additional
security mechanism to prevent unauthorized accesses. One
alternative is to 'assume full restriction for all users' at
the beginning and than to insert some security
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specifications to authorize some users to access if such
access is needed. In this way, the system will have no
insecure gap and the system will be easy to handle in terms
of the overhead.
3 . _A Comparison of the methods
Method 1 provides a more secure and practical
security mechanism. With method 1 , the overhead will appear
at the time of insertion the new security specifications.
Initially, we will isolate all users from the newly created
descriptor and therefore from the new cluster. Thus, all of
the cluster-based security specifications will be "all
accesses are disallowed" for all of t-he users. We do not
care about each descriptor's security specifications in the
new cluster in order to derive the cluster-based security
specification from the descriptor-level access control
information
.
If we want to authorize a user with an access right
on the new descriptor, then we have to go back and check the
security specifications for the other descriptors in the
defining cluster. That is, we must determine if there are
any descriptors with more strict security specifications.
If one of the old security specifications is more strict
than the new security specification, then we accept the old






<Job ,SALESMAN> ,<Dept ,TOY>}
Let us assume that the security specifications in the
augmented_DSST for user_i on the descriptors in the
satisfying cluster are as in Figure 5.3. Let the new
cluster be defined by three descriptors where descriptor Dc
is the new descriptor for SALESMAN. The default security
specification for the new descriptor is 'all accesses are
disallowed for user_i . The cluster-based security
specification will be the union of the descriptor-based
security specifications of the corresponding descriptors.
Here, the security specification of descriptor Dc owerhelms
the others and the cluster-based security specification for.
the new cluster for user_i will be 'all accesses are
disallowed '
.
If we want to authorize user_i to read those
emloyees' salary who are SALESMAN, then we change descriptor
Dc's security specification. The new security specification
will have all possible accesses are disallowed except
retrieval of the Salary attribute. After this descriptor-
based security specification has been changed, we have to
rederive the cluster-based security specification. For this
process, we have to look at the DSST, the security
specifications for descriptors Da and Db, in order to make
sure that other descriptors in the cluster do not have any





id ! I Specifications for user-1
Da |0<Salary<10K !<Name,No_Update> ,<Salary,NO_Retrieve>
Db 1 DeptrTOY ! <Dept , NO_Update>
Dc 1 Name=JOE I ALL
Figure 5.3 An Augmented DSST for User i
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authorize user i to read SALESMEN'S salary. In this example
descriptor Da has the restriction for user_i, such that,
user_i can not retrieve the SALESMAN'S salary if the salary
of the salesman is between and 10000. Since the salary is
in this range, the modified descriptor-level security
specification will have no effect on the cluster-based
security specification. i.e., descriptor Da's security
specification ( salary , No_Retrieve) is the most strict
restriction. Thus, the cluster-based security specification
will be unchanged as 'ALL'.
If descriptor Da did not have a restriction on the
retrieval of salaries, then security specification
derivation would be different. We would have specified a
field-level access control as <salary , No_Update> , since we
want user i to be able to retrieve the salaries of the
employees but not to change them.
We have elaborated the directory management
information based postprocessing in chapter 3 , '^ and 5. In
the next chapter, we will elaborate postprocessing phase of
the access control system.
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VI . THE POSTPROCESSING
In chapter III, we described how access control was
divided into preprocessing postprocessing, and we developed
the database-creator-specified access control information
for preprocessing access control. In chapter 4 and 5, we
have elaborated the preprocessing access control. In this
chapter, we will develope the access control tools of
postprocessing. In the rest of the chapter, we will use the
term 'postprocessing' for the postprocessing step of the
access control whenever there is no confusing with the
postprocessing function of the controller.
A. ACCESS CONTROLS IN POSTPROCESSING
We described the MDBS access control system mostly as
preprocessing. Recall that preprocessing is restricted to
the directory attributes. Now, we also want to establish a
protection mechanism on the non-directory attributes. In
preprocessing, we have been able to restrict some operations
on the non-directory attributes. For example, the descriptor
containing the attribute value TOY has been specified on the
directory attribute Department. In addition, the attribute
Salary is a non-directory attribute. Assuming that the
descriptor-based security specification for TOY is: <--
, Salary, No Retrieve>. The meaning of the descriptor-based
98
security specification above is: the user can not retrieve
the salaries of those employees who are in the department
TOY. Thus, we protect a non-directory attribute (Salary)
from an operation (retrieve) with regard to the value of a
directory attribute ( department=TOY) . The purpose of
postprocessing is to establish protection on the directory
or non-directory attribute with regard to the value of a
non-directory attribute. If the attribute department in the
previous example were a non-directory attribute, then the
access control would require postprocessing instead of
preprocessing
.
B. THE POSTPROCESSING PHASE
We know that each backend in MDBS has three major
functions: directory management, concurrency control and
record processing. We also know that access control
preprocessing is performed in directory management utilizing
the directory management related information.
Postprocessing deals with the values of the non-
directory attributes. There is no way to determine the
physical location of the records with regard to their non-
directory attribute values. Thus, we can perform the
postprocessing only after record retrievals by the record
processing function of the backends.
Record processing has two major functions: the physical
data operations and the aggregate operations. A physical
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data operation depends on the type of the request. For
insert requests, the physical data operation stores the
records into the secondary storage. For non-insert requests,
the physical data operation first fetches the records from
the secondary storage and filters the records which do not
satisfy the query in the user request. It then performs the
intended non-insert operation such as the deletion of
record, update of an attribute value of the record or
extraction of some attribute values of the record for a
retrieve request. An aggregate operation performs the
partial aggregate operation for the backend.
In the physical data operation, access control entails
the follwing: First, it will check that the user has any
security specifications specified on the non-directory
attributes. If the user does not have any security
specifications on the non-directory attributes, then the
access control will have no affect in record processing. Let
us assume that the user has some security specifications on
the non-directory attributes. During the physical data
operation, the backend fetches the records one track at a
time. Each record is checked to see whether it satisfies the
query in the request or not. If the record does not satisfy
the query, then it is ignored. After this step,
postprocessing checks will be performed for each satisfying
record. After postprocessing, the satisfying and authorized
records are sent to the aggregate function of record
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processing. In the following sections, we will describe the
access control information and the steps in postprocessing.
C. THE POSTPROCESSING ACCESS CONTROL INFORMATION AS
SPECIFIED BY THE DATABASE CREATOR
In this section, we will describe the database-creator-
specified access control information for postprocessing. We
will also describe how to store this information. The main
idea of the access control information for postprocessing is
the same as the access control information described in
Chapter III for preprocessing. We, again, want to answer the
following question: who can perform what operations on which
part of the database. Specifying the first two items in the
question will be the same as for preprocessing. This
information is obtained from the user-ids and the access
operations, respectively. Specifying 'which' portion of the
database depends on the security specifications on the non-
directory attribute values given by the database creator.
The database creator specifies attribute-level access
controls on the non-directory attributes. An attribute -
level access control specified on a non-directory attribute
is of the form:





where lower and upper are the domain limits on the
attribute, the aggregate operator is one of the aggregate
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operators, the attribute is a directory or non-directory
attribute and the dissallowed access operation is one of the
set {No_Retrieve
,
No_Update, No_Delete, No_Insert}. The
aggregate operator may be used only for the attribute-level
access controls with disallowed access operation as
No_Retrieve. The attribute entry is only included when the
dissallowed access operation is No_Retrieve or No_Update. If
the non-directory attribute which will be protected has
single value instead of value range, then the upper value
will not be specified.
The difference between the field-level access controls
for preprocessing and the attribute-level access controls
for postprocessing are as follows. The field-level access
controls are built on the descriptors while the attribute-
level access controls are built on the non-directory
attributes. In addition, for the attribute-level access
controls, the value boundary to be protected is specified
with the upper and the lower bounds which indicate the value
range on the non-directory attribute. The rest of the
access controls are the same.
An attribute security specification may be 'all' or a
collection of attribute-level access controls. An attribute
security specification of 'all' indicates that all accesses
are disallowed for the respective user. The attribute
security specification on an attribute is the collection of
attribute-level access controls for the attribute. It can be
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represented as follows:
(Attribute) { <lower , upper , Agg_op
,
Attr .disallowed access op>
,
For example, we might have the attribute security
specification on the non-directory attribute Salary for the
various ranges of the Salary as
(Salary) { < 1 000 , 2000 ,— , Job , No_Update>
,
<1000,5000,— ,— ,No_Delete>, .
<4000,5000,— ,— ,No_Insert>} • '
The meaning of this attribute security specification is as
follows: the user can not update the Job attribute of a
record, if the record has a salary between $1000 and $2000.
Nor can the user delete a record if the record has a salary
between $1000 and $5000. In addition, the insertion of a
record with Salary between $4000 and $5000 is not
authorized .
We store the access control information for the
postprocessing phase into the two layers of tables, the
non - directory - attribute table (NAT) and the attribute -
security - specification table (ASST). These tables and their
implementations are discussed in the next two subsections.
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1. The Non - Directory - Attribute Table ( NAT )
There is one NAT (see Figure 6.1), if the user has
some restrictions on the non-directory attributes. In the
NAT, we store only those non-directory attributes which have
an attribute security specifications specified on them. The
user-index in the backends' main memory has a pointer for
the NAT for each user. If the user does not have any
restrictions with regard to the non-directory attribute
values, then this pointer will be null. The NAT corresponds
to the attribute table in directory management. The
secondary storage-based NAT implementation is also the same
as the attribute table [R'ef.6]. Thus it will not be
elaborated here. Each attribute in the NAT has a pointer to
the corresponding ASST for the attribute. The ASST is
described in the next subsection.
2. The Attribute -Security -Specification Table (ASST)
We store the attribute security specifications for a
particular non-directory attribute in an ASST (Figure 6.2).
Thus, each non-directory attribute in the NAT has an ASST.
The relationship between the NAT and the ASST is shown in
Figure 6.3. We store the ASST in the secondary storage.
D. THE POSTPROCESSING OPERATION
The output of directory management is the secondary
memory addresses of those records which are authorized by
preprocessing. Those records are fetched and field-level
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Figure 6.1 A Non-Directory-Attribute Table (NAT)
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Figure 6.2 An Attribute-Security-Specification
Table (ASST) on Attribute-A for User i
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Figure 6.3 NAT and Corresponding ASST for User i
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values are examined by the record processing function. In
the physical data operation part of record processing, the
records are fetched from the secondary storage a track at a
time. Each record in the track is examined to see that it
satisfies the query in the request. For satisfying records,
the operations necessary for the request type
( insert , delete , update , retrieve) are performed. Since the
postprocessing deals with the field-level values of the
records, we can perform postprocessing in the physical data
operation part of the record processing function.
Consequently, we will perform the postprocessing operation
for the records satisfying the query.
Before record processing is started, we will look at the
user-index. If the pointer to the NAT is null in the user-
index, then record processing will not have any
postprocessing checks. If the user does have a pointer to
the NAT, then we search the NAT. The NAT stores the non-
directory attributes which have security specifications on
them and a pointer to the ASST for the corresponding
attributes. We fetch all the ASSTs with the pointers
provided from NAT. All the attribute security specifications
in the ASSTs are brought into the backend's main memory,
since we will use all this access control information for
each record. Now, we are ready to perform the record
processing with postprocessing capability. For each record,
if it satisfies the query in the request, then we will
107
perform the postprocessing checks on it. This operation will
be described in the following section.
E. THE POSTPROCESSING AUTHORIZATION PROCESS
The authorization process in postprocessing is the same
as the authorization process in preprocessing (Chapter IV).
The only difference is: we deal with records in
postprocesing whereas we deal with clusters in
preprocessing. This process is done as follows. For each
attribute security specification obtained from ASSTs, the
record's corresponding non-directory attribute-value is
fetched. If the attribute value is not between the upper
and the lower values of the attribute security
specification, then we conclude that the record can be
authorized for this attribute security specification. The
same operation is performed for the next attribute security
specification. If the attribute-value j^ between the upper
and the lower values of the attribute security
specification, then we perform exactly the same
authorization process of preprocessing for each request type
(see Section IV-A-2) .
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we have described the design and
analysis of an access control mechanism for the multi-
backend database system (MDBS). The design of this access
control mechanism is based on two major objectives. The
first objective is to introduce an access control capability
to MDBS without changing the existing parts of the system.
The second objective is to have an access control mechanism
without adding excessive overhead to the system. To
accomplish these objectives, the access control mechanism is
incorparated into the directory management. Thus, access
control is performed before any record is retrieved.
In addition, the capability to protect information which
does not have directory has been provided. This capabilities
can be exercised by the database creator. The user is
allowed to create a new Type C descriptor with an insert
request, if the user is authorized to create a new
descriptor on the corresponding attribute. The access
control information for the new descriptor is specified by
the database creator. Furthermore, the database creator is
provided with the capability to modify the access control
information
.
As an access control principle, if the request is
partially authorized, then the partial result is given to
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the user with a warning. For example, let us assume that the
user wants to retrieve the names of those employees whose
salaries are higher than $2000. However, the user is only
authorized to learn the names of those whose salaries are up
to $5000. In this case, MDBS will give the user the names of
those whose salaries are between $2000 and $5000 and will
warn the user that there are other names which are not
authorized for the user.
The access control information for each user is stored
in the descr iptor-to-descriptor-based-secur ity-specif ication
table (DSST), the cluster-to-cluster-based-security-
specification table (CSST) and the -non-directory-attr ibute
table (NAT). Entries in these tables are reached by
following pointers in the user-index. For simplicity, we
stored the user-index in the backends' main memory. For a
database with a large number of users, it might not be
feasable to store the user-index in the backends' main
memories. The user-index can then be stored in the backends*
secondary storages and the user's portion can be brought
into the main memories at the log-on time.
Finally, the access control mechanism of MDBS has been
designed to handle the value-dependent and pattern sensitive
information (see Chapter I). It also provides protection
for statistical data. Furthermore, it overcomes the pass-
through problem, since records in a cluster are protected in
the same way (i.e., only the authorized records are
1 10
accessed. The unauthorized records are never passed-through
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